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THE REVITALIZATION OF Qui TAM ACTIONS: THE
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION
KATHERINE ZIMMERER*

I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning in the 1970's, unprecedented response to pollution
and depletion of America's natural resources swept across the
nation.' Major environmental protection statutes were enacted and
the environmental activist movement was born. 2 Many activist
groups however, did not feel that the government alone could
monitor and regulate American industries and they wanted the power
3
to enforce environmental regulations through the courts. Due to

effective lobbying, environmental statutes began to contain
provisions that allowed for citizen suits. 4 ' The first citizen suit
provision was added in 1970 to the Clean Air Act (CAA). 5 Since
then, every major environmental law passed has included a citizen
suit provision. 6
Although citizen suits allow the public to be more active in
enforcing environmental protection laws, they have their limits. 7 To
begin, a citizen must have standing. 8 One of the key elements of
standing is that the plaintiff must have an injury-in-fact. 9 What then
happens when a person who has not been injured, and thus does not
have standing, wants to bring suit against a company, or even a state,
for breaking the law?
It is just this type of situation for which qui tam actions have
been revitalized. This ancient concept, encompassed in the current
False Claims Act (FCA), allows individuals who have not been
injured to sue a defendant on behalf of the United States
"Katherine Zimmerer
'Elizabeth Rae Potts, Comment, A Proposal for an Alternative to the Private
Enforcement of Environmental Regulations and Statutes Through Citizen Suits: Transferable
Property Rights in Common Resources, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 547, 549 (1999).

'Id. at 549.
31d.
4
1d. at 549-50.
5Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000
U. ILL. L. REv. 185,192(2000).
6

Id.
The only exception is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.
7See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that
the citizen plaintiff must have an injury-in-fact in order to have standing to bring suit).
'Id. at 560.
91d.
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Government.'" During the 1990's, the FCA gained stature as a tool
for enforcing environmental laws. " Today, environmental litigators
consider qui tam actions when seeking to enforce a wide array of
environmental laws ranging "from grazing permit requirements to
resource extraction limitations on public land.' 2 However, the FCA
has its limitations.
Section I of this Note addresses the differences between qui
tam actions under the FCA and the citizen suit provisions found in
environmental statutes. Section II reveals the history behind qui tam
actions and the FCA. Section III discusses the elements of the False
Claims Act in four parts. Part one examines the definition of claim
under the FCA, what a claim is and when a claim is presented. Part
two addresses public disclosure as a jurisdictional bar and part three

discusses the "original source" exception to that bar. Part four looks
at the definition of "person" under the liability section of the FCA.
Section IV deals with the constitutional issues in three parts. Part one
briefly examines the standing issue under Article III. Part two looks
at the Article II issues involving the Take Care Clause and the
Appointments Clause and part three considers the possibility of
states' immunity against suits by citizens under the Eleventh
Amendment.
I. Qui TAM

ACTIONS UNDER THE

FCA AND CITIZEN

SUITS

While similarities exist between citizen suits and qui tam
actions, there are key differences that can hinder, or even bar a citizen
suit, but not a qui tam action. 3 Under both actions, plaintiffs must
make their claims known to the relevant agencies. 14 However, qui
tam relators bring suit on behalf of the government for injuries
sustained by the government while citizen suit plaintiffs bring suit in
their own names for injuries that they sustained on an individual
basis. '5 The Supreme Court has held that a citizen plaintiff must have
standing to bring a suit, and in order to have standing, the plaintiff
must have suffered concrete, actual or imminent6 injury-in-fact caused
by the defendant and redressable by the courts.'

"See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2001).
1

" Ann M. Lininger, The False ClaimsAct and Environmental Law Enforcement, 16
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 577 (1997).

"Id. at 577-78.
13See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex. relStevens, 529
U.S. 765 (2000) [hereinaftler Stevens]; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
"See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 765.
See id.
'6See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555.
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Environmental citizen suit provisions require the plaintiff to
give sixty days notice before filing suit to allow the federal
government and state officials the opportunity to prevent a filing by17
initiating and prosecuting a suit on their own against the violator.
The FCA requires a sixty-day post-filing in camera period to allow
to intervene and take primary
the government to decide whether
18
responsibility for the prosecution.
Citizen suits have withstood constitutional attacks premised
on the Take Care Clause and the Appointments Clause of the United
States Constitution.' 9 Therefore, Article II does not currently present
an issue with respect to citizen suits. 20 However, the primary setback
to citizen suits, compared to qui tam actions, is the requirement of
individual standing.2' Under citizen suits, if a plaintiff has not been
individually injured then they do not have Article III standing.22
Under qui tam actions, however, a claimant is bringing suit on behalf
• 23
of the government and therefore does not need individual standing.
There are limits to qui tam actions, which the remainder of
this note will address. One such limit is that the defendant must
present a false claim.24 Therefore, if a false claim is not involved a
plaintiff cannot use the qui tam provisions under the FCA. However,
if the plaintiff has been injured by an environmental violator, a
citizen suit may be an option. Therefore, it is important to remember
citizen suit provisions in environmental laws while also looking for
other avenues to bring suit.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The False Claims Act encompasses the idea of private
enforcement of laws. The concept of private enforcement began with
the Water Pollution Act of 1388 in England.25 Such enforcement was
called a "qui tam" action.2 6 Under the Water Pollution Act of 1388, a
private person could sue on behalf of the government and receive a
portion of the damages collected as a reward. 27 England also used
17Trip Van Noppen, Citizen Suits and Defenses Thereto: Constitutionality of Citizen
Suit Provisions, SF97 ALI-ABA 581, 584-85 (2001).

831 U.S.C. § 3739(b)(2) (2001).
19Noppen, supra note 17, at 583, 585.
2OSee id.
21

2 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
See id.
23

See Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2001).
2 Potts, supra, note 1, at 561.
24
5See
6

1d. Qui tam is an abbreviation for "qui tam prodomino rege quam pro si ipso in

hac parte sequitur," which means, "[He] who sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself."
Id. at 561.

7

2 1d.
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qui tam actions to enforce penal codes rather than using government
police force.28 The concept of qui tam actions spread to the United
States and was prevalent immediately before and after the framing of
the Constitution.29 Colonies passed informer statutes that expressly
authorized qui tam suits. 30 Moreover, the First Congress enacted a
number of informer statutes, with some providing for a bounty3 and
others allowing for both a bounty and an express cause of action. '
The False Claims Act is a modem example of a qui tam
action. The FCA was enacted in 1863 to respond to fraudulent
activities by large Civil War contractors. 32 At that time, the penalties
were $2,000 for each false claim, with double damages to fully
compensate the government and the individual who brought the suit,
known as the relator, who was entitled to half of the amount
recovered.33 In 1943, the FCA was amended to prevent abuse by
private individuals. 34 The most significant change was that
individuals could no longer bring a qui tam civil suit based on
information the government already possessed. 3' The relator now
had to present their evidence to the government at the time of filing
and the government had discretion to decide whether or not they
wanted to intervene in the case.36 If the government intervened, the
relator no longer had control over the case and could recover a
maximum of ten percent of the proceeds.37
In 1986, Congress again amended the FCA.38 In an attempt to
encourage more qui tam actions, the amendments increased the
damages to three times the government damage (treble damages) and
allowed relators to recover attorney's fees from the losing
defendant. 39 The changes ignited a spark in the American public as
qui tam actions increased from 33 filings and $200,000 in recovery in
1987 to 529 filings and $641 million in recovery in 1997. 40
III. ELEMENTS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
281d.
29
3 Stevens,

529 U.S. 765, 776 (2000).
0ld.
3
Id. at 776-77.

32Tauny L. Histed, Note, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens: The Decreased Effectiveness ofthe Qui Tam Action, 2001 L.R. M.S.U. D.C.L. 161,

164 (2001).

33Kara Nicole Schmidt, Note, Privatizing Environmental Enforcement: The Bounty
Incentives of the False Claims Act, 9 GFO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 663,668-69 (1997).
"Id.
at 669.
3
s1d. This included criminal prosecutions.
36d.
37Id.

38id.
39Potts, supra note I, at 562.

"Id.
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The FCA defines -claim" and lists six potential causes of
action when a claim violates the Act. 41

The FCA also includes a

seventh cause of action thai does not require a claim as defined by the
Act.4 2 The seventh claim is known as a reverse claim because the
false statement or record is used to conceal, avoid, or decrease an

obligation owed to the government as opposed to receiving money
from the government.43 The first two causes of action set forth in the
Act are the most important to understand, because the 44remaining
actions, excluding the reverse false claim, build upon them.
A. Definition of "Claim"

A claim is any request or demand for money or property
made to any recipient in which the United States Government
provides any portion of the money or property requested or

demanded.45 Under the first cause of action, found in § 3729(a)(1),
the focus is on the submission of a false claim against the United
States. 46 A plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) that the
defendant presented or caused to be presented to an agent of the

United States a claim for payment; (2) that the claim was false or
fraudulent; (3) that the defendant knew that the claim was false or
fraudulent; and (4) that the United States has suffered damages as a

U.S.C. § 3729 (2001). This section reads: "(a) Any person who (1)knowingly
"'31
presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government
or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment
or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; (3) conspires
to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid; (4) has
possession, custody or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government
and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully to conceal the property, delivers, or
causes to be delivered, less property than the amount for which the person receives a certificate
or receipt; (5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or
to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the
receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true; (6) knowingly
buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or
employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forced, who lawfully may not sell or
pledge the property... is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less
than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person..."
4231 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2001): This section reads: "Any person who.. knowingly
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or
decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the government is liable to the
United States for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times
the Government sustains because of the act of that person..."
the amount 4of
3 damages which
1d.
"See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (2001) (discussing a conspiracy to defraud).
4s31
U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2001).
4631
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2001).
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result. 47 Thus, if a government contractor fails to abide by the
environmental law compliance provisions in a contract yet, in order
to be compensated, presents a bill to the government stating that he or
she has fully complied with the contract requirements, then the
contractor has presented a false claim. 48 The government contractor
does not need to take any affirmative false conduct, such as false
certification, to present a claim under § 3729(a)(1). 49 A person need
only seek a benefit from the government when they are not eligible
for such benefit or fail to reveal that they are not eligible to violate
the FCA. 0
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in affirming the
district court's decision in United States ex rel. Fallion v. Accudyne
Corp.,5 1 supported this analysis, holding that a defendant presents a
false claim under §3729(a)(1) if the defendant knowingly fails to
adhere to the environmental compliance provisions of a contract and
then seeks payment for work as though they had complied with the
terms.52
Under § 3729(a)(2), a false claim is presented when a person
knowingly makes, uses, or causes someone else to make or use a
false record or statement to enable a person to obtain benefits from
the United States.53 One court has concluded that a defendant
subcontractor presents a false claim under §3729(a)(2) when it
unlawfully discharges oil in violation of the Clean Water Act and
then submits invoices for payment containing false certifications of
environmental compliance.54
The Ninth Circuit has concluded that school district forms
that were filed with the state, which inaccurately reported the school
district's special education student population and incorporated
improper evaluation techniques, were not false claims under
The court found that the forms contained no
§3729(a)(2)."
certification of regulatory compliance and funding was not
conditioned on any such certification. 56 The court outlined two
questions relating to liability: (1) whether the false statement caused
the government to provide the benefit; and (2) whether any relation
existed between the subject matter of the false statement and the

471d.
4

'Lininger, supra note 11, at 577.

49

5
3t

1d. at 583.

ld.

52United States ex reL. Fallion v. Accudyne Corp., 97 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1996).

d.

'331 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2001).
4
s See Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, 916 F.Supp 702 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
5
' 6See United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996).
1 !d. at 1266.

2002-20031
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event triggering the government's loss.57 Since the forms that were
submitted did not require funding recipients to certify their
compliance with federal laws and federal regulations, there was no
58
false statement that caused the government to provide a benefit.
The FCA only attaches liability to the claim for payment and not to
the underlying fraudulent activity."
The Fourth Circuit has broadly defined when a false claim has
been submitted.60 In Harrisonv. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,
the district court determined that the FCA did not reach situations
where submissions to the government contained false statements.6'
Instead, the FCA only reached situations in which the claim itself was
false or fraudulent. 62 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
this reasoning. 63 The court based their decision on legislative history
that declared the FCA should be broadly construed and that each and
every claim submitted under a contract or other agreement that was
"originally obtained by means offalse statements or other corrupt or
fraudulent conduct" constituted a false claim.64
Most recently, the Second Circuit joined the Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Circuits agreeing that a claim under the FCA is legally
false only where a party certifies compliance with a statute or
regulation as a condition to governmental payment. 65 The court
stated that the Act does not encompass instances of regulatory
noncompliance that are irrelevant to the government's disbursement
decisions.66

These cases seem to indicate that a defendant presents a false
claim under § 3729(a)(2) when the defendant knowingly submits a
false certification of eligibility for a benefit to the government only
when receipt of that benefit is conditioned on certifying such
eligibility. Thus, even if the benefit is conditioned upon a certain
requirement and that requirement is not satisfied, no false claim has

57

1d.
"I1d. at 267.
59

1d. at 266.
61Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d. 776 (4th Cir. 1999).
6
d. at 780.
621d.
63

See id.

"Id. at 786 (emphasis added).

'5Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that the FCA claim is
legally false only where the defendant certifies compliance with a statute or regulation as a
condition to governmental payment; medical forms containing certification that the services

shown on the forms were medically necessary did not contain express false certification and
implied false certification is applied with respect to a medical provider only when the statute or
regulation upon which the FCA plaintiff relies expressly state that the provider must comply to

be paid.).

66Id.
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been presented under § 3729(a)(2) unless the claim certified that the
requirement has been satisfied.
A reverse false claim arises when a person makes or causes
someone else to make a statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an
obligation owed to the United States.67 The Fifth Circuit has held
that when a defendant lessor of a government owned apartment
complex overstates expenses in order to decrease the amount owed to
the government, a claim has been presented under the FCA.68 One
district court held that submitting a report to the government
understating Navy flying time spent assisting the filming of a movie,
and thereby understating the amount of money the filmmakers owed
the government constituted a claim for the purposes of the FCA.69
The court in Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing70 rejected the
argument that a mere failure to self-report a Clean Water Act
violation constituted a false claim.7' The court concluded that in
order to state a false claim under §3729(a)(7), the defendant must
have taken some affirmative action.72 The court did find, however,
that failure to record a violation in the company log that would
normally contain such information could constitute a false claim if a
government agency relied on the log to conduct its regulatory
function.73 The court's reasoning was that if the log excludes a major
event that it should otherwise contain, then the record is false. 74 If
the government relies on or reviews the logs as part of its regulatory
role, then the defendants have submitted a false report.7
Section 3729(a)(7) requires some affirmative conduct to
present a false claim. This requirement is similar to the affirmative
statement required under § 3729(a)(2) and is in contrast with the less
rigorous requirements for no affirmative conduct, under §
3729(a)( 1).76

B. Public Disclosure
As noted earlier, the FCA denies courts jurisdiction under
several different situations. 77 The most difficult jurisdictional bar
denies a court jurisdiction when the action is "based upon public
6731 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2001).
6
69See Smith v. United States, 287

F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1961).
See United States v. Douglas, 626 F.Supp. 621,626-29 (E.D. Va. 1985).
"°916
F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
71
/d.

7ld. at 708.
731d.
74

1d.

751d.
76

See31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2001).

"See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2001).
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disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or
Government Accounting Office report....or from the news
media. ... ,78 However, there is an exception. If the qui tam plaintiff
has "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which
are based," then the court has jurisdiction to hear the
the allegations
79
case.

Courts have struggled to explain when an action is "based
upon public disclosure of allegations or transactions." The D.C.
Circuit Court unequivocally concluded that when discovery material
is filed with the court, and not subject to a protective order, such
material has been publicly disclosed in a civil hearing. 80 The court
did "restrict that interpretation to discovery material that had actually
been made public through filing, as opposed to discovery material
that had not been filed [but was] theoretically available upon the
public's request." 8' The court then went on to define allegations or
transactions and determined that there was a distinction between
allegations or transactions and "information as a matter of common
usage and sound interpretation of the FCA.' '82 As illustrated by the
court, assume X + Y = Z; Z represents the allegation of fraud and X
and Y represent its essential elements.83 In order to disclose the
fraudulent transaction, both X and Y must be revealed so that the
readers may infer Z, i.e. the allegation of fraud.84
The Ninth Circuit clarified that evidence publicly disclosed
for the first time in the discovery phase of a qui tam suit is not barred
from use in that same suit by public disclosure.85 The Ninth Circuit
has also adopted the District of Columbia Circuit Court's analysis,
stating that the combination of X and Y must be revealed to the
public in order for public disclosure to be a bar.86

However, other courts have not been so generous to would-be
relators. The Tenth Circuit has held that a government report
identifying a defendant's claims for payment as impermissible
activated the jurisdictional bar.87 Although the report did not use the
7s31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2001).

7931 U.S.C. § 3740(e)(4)(A), (B) (2001).
S°United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal R.R. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (involving discovery material obtained by the plaintiff from the defendant in a prior
case between the same plaintiff and defendant, not discovery material that had been obtained in
the qui tam suit.).
81
d. at 653 (emphasis omitted).
"23Jd. at 653.
81d.
ld.

"5Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
86
United States ex rel. Found. Aiding the Elderly v. Horizon West Inc., 265 F.3d
1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
"7 United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1996).
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words "fraud" or "false claims," the court concluded that the report
disclosed allegations or transactions underlying the claim since the
report identified the defendant's conduct as unreasonable or
unallowable. 88
C. The "Original Source" Exception
Only when it has been determined that the allegations or
transactions for a FCA claim have been publicly disclosed will the
issue of the original source doctrine be raised. 89 The original source
exception grants the court jurisdiction to hear an action even if the
allegations or transactions have been publicly disclosed. 90 In order to
be an original source, the relator must have "direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based..." 9'
and voluntarily 92provide the information to the government prior to
filing an action.
Two issues are presented by the original source doctrine.
First, what constitutes direct and independent knowledge and second,
what is the definition of information? One court has determined that
direct and independent are conjunctive requirements.93 Direct
signifies absence of an intervening agency or person and independent
knowledge is knowledge that is not dependent on public disclosure.94
The court also defined information, stating that the relator must
possess direct and independent knowledge of the information
underlying the allegation as opposed to direct and independent
knowledge of the transaction itself.9 Therefore, the relator does not
have to posses direct and independent knowledge of all the "vital
ingredients to a fraudulent transaction. 96 Rather, the relator only has
of any essential element of
to have direct and independent knowledge
97
transaction.
fraudulent
the underlying
The Tenth Circuit has defined direct knowledge as
"knowledge gained through the relator's own efforts" and not the
efforts of others, while independent knowledge means such
knowledge not derived from the information of others, even if those

.ld
"gWang, 975 F.2d at 1412.
"31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2001).
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2001),
9t31
92
1d.

"United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal R.R. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).
94Id.

95Id.
6
1

Id. at 656-57.

97d

2002-2003]

Qui TAM

REVITALIZATION

others qualify as original sources." In Rockwell, the relator was
considered an original source even though he was not aware of the
specific persons or documents involved. 99 The relator learned of the
facts underlying his claim by reviewing Rockwell's plans for
producing pondcrete.'0° The relator's knowledge that a defective
pondcrete manufacturing process would be employed constituted
knowledge of information underlying or supporting the allegation
concerning Rockwell's alleged fraudulent activity (the submission of
claims to the Department of Energy falsely stating that Rocky Flats
was in compliance with environmental, health, and safety laws). 10'
Therefore, it appears that as long as the relator has knowledge of
fraud, and such fraud is being perpetuated upon the government in
order to receive
money, the relator has direct and independent
102
knowledge.
However, three weeks prior to deciding Rockwell, the Tenth
Circuit decided another case involving whether a relator is a "source"
if, in the pre-filing disclosure stage, the relator withholds his identity
and the identity of potential defendants.' °3 In United States ex rel.
King v. Hillcrest Health Center, Inc., the issue was whether the
relator had satisfied the voluntary disclosure element of the original
source definition.'0 4 The relator averred that his attorney met with
several United States attorneys prior to filing and that they were
offered a chance to meet with him.10 5 The attorney provided
additional information after the meeting.'0 6 However, during the
meeting, the names of the relator and potential defendants were not
disclosed.'0 7 The court defined the term information as referring "to
any essential element of the fraudulent transaction."' 0 8 The court
then determined that the identity of the accuser and the accused are
information on which the qui tam allegations are based.'0 9 By
withholding the identities of the relator and the accused, the

8

Cir.
United States ex relStone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 265 F.3d 1157, 1169 (10th
2001) (citing United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Scis., Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1006-07 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
991d.

100Id.
01

1 d.
02
3

See id.

'0 United States ex rel. King v. Hillcrest Health Ctr., Inc., 264 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir.

2001).

"'4 1d.

105Md.
1071d.
'ISd. at 1280.
'09King, 264 F.3d at 1271.
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government was deprived of key facts necessary in its effort to
confirm, substantiate, or evaluate the allegations." 0
These cases attempt to clarify the necessary elements for an
original source. As demonstrated, the decisions are factually driven.
If the relator appears to be withholding pertinent information and
stifles the government from investigating the allegations, then the
defendant will lose if the information has been publicly disclosed.
However, if the relator attempts to give the government all of the
information in the relatot's possession, then a court is likely to give
the relator a more favorable result. even if such information has been
publicly disclosed. Courts will not allow relators to abuse the
purpose of the Act.
D. "Persons" Defined Under the FCA
The FCA prohibits "[a]ny person" from submitting a false
claim or causing another person to submit a false claim to the United
States government."' Although the FCA defines certain terms, the
Act does not define the 2term person for the purpose of determining
who the Act applies to. 1
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court defined the term
person to exclude states. " In addressing the issue of whether states
were persons under the FCA, the Court began by claiming that it
must apply the longstanding interpretative assumption that sovereigns
are not persons.' 4 This presumption is especially applicable when "it
is claimed that Congress has subjected the States to liability to which
they had not been subject before."" 5 The court looked to the
precursor of the current FCA. 116 The Court indicated that it was
unclear whether the FCA precursor applied to private corporations
since it applied only to "any person not in the military or naval forces
of the United States..." but was careful to express that they were not
casting doubt upon the assumption that the term person includes
corporations.' 1 7 The Court's reasoning for not casting doubt on this
assumption was that the presumption regarding corporations was the
opposite of the one governing states: corporations are presumptively
1"Id.
"'See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2001).
"2See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2001) (defining knowing, knowingly, and claim).
" 3Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
"4 1d. at 780 (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941); United
States v. Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947)).
"W. at 781 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989);

Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979)).
"'Stevens, 529 U.S. at 780-81.

'"Id.at 782 (citing United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care Ctr., Inc.,
797 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986)).
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covered by the term person. 18 The Court determined that the FCA
"does less than nothing to overcome the presumption that States are
not covered.'"' 9 The Court recognized that the FCA has undergone
changes suggested
several changes but did not feel that any of those
20
broadening the term person to include states. 1
The Court also looked at other features of the statute to
support the conclusion that states are not persons under the FCA. 2'
The Court looked to §3733, which allows the Attorney General to
issue civil investigative demands to "any person.. .possess[ing]
information relevant to a false claims investigation."'' 22 This section
of the Act contains a provision that defines person, "Wtlor purposes of
this section," to include states. 12 3 The Court determined that the
presence of a definitional provision in §3733 that includes states as
persons with the absence of such a definition in the definitional
provision in §3729 suggests that states are not persons for purposes
of qui tam liability under §3729.124 The Court also stated that the
damages imposed by the current version of the FCA are punitive in
nature. 25 Imposing punitive damages on States is inconsistent with
imposition of punitive damages on
the presumption against
26
governmental entities.
Finally, the Court looked to the Program Fraud Civil
Remedies Act of 1986 (PFCRA), a sister scheme that creates
administrative remedies for false claims and was enacted just before
the 1986 FCA amendments.' 27 The PFCRA contains a definition of
persons subject to liability that does not include states. 128 The Court
stated, "[I]t would be most peculiar to subject States to treble
damages and civil penalties in qui tam actions under the FCA, but
exempt them from relatively smaller damages provided under the
PFCRA."' 129 The Court therefore determined that various features of
8

"'i d. (citing I U.S.C. § 1 (2001)).

529 U.S. at 782 (emphasis added).
"'Stevens,
20

1 1d. In 1982 Congress replaced the phrase "any person not in the military or naval

forces of the United States, nor in the militia called into or actually employed in the service of
the United States" with the phrase "[a] person not a member of an armed force of the United
States." In 1986, Congress eliminated the blanket exemption for members of the armed forces
replacing the phrase "[a] person not a member of an armed force of the United States" with the
current "[a]ny person." Id. at 782.
"'Id. at 783.

22
' 1d. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3733(a)(1) (2001)).
"2431d. at 784 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3733(l)(4) (2001)).

1 1d
'Stevens, 529 U.S. at 765.
26

1 1d. at 784-85 (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 262-63

(1981)).

"7Id. at 786 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(6) (2001)).

...
1d. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 8801(a)(6) (2001) (defining "person" as "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or private organization")).
9
' 1d. at 786.
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the FCA do not provide "affirmative indications that30 the term
'person' includes States for purposes of qui tam liability".'
Two Courts of Appeals have extended the Supreme Court's
ruling.
The Fifth Circuit has subsequently held that local
governments, such as school boards, are not persons for purposes of
FCA liability. 3 ' The court's reasoning was that the FCA imposes
punitive damages on those who violate the Act and that such
imposition was contrary to the "well-settled" presumption that
governments,
including local governments, are not subject to punitive
32
damages. 1
The Eighth Circuit concluded that a state official acting
within the scope of his/her official duties is not a person with respect
to liability under the FCA because a damage claim against a state
33
employee in his/her official capacity is a suit against the state.
However, a state official acting in his/her 1individual
capacity may be
34
liable for money damages under the FCA.
As the FCA currently reads, states are not persons for
purposes of FCA liability. Extending the Supreme Court's decision,
local governments may also not be considered persons for purposes
of FCA liability and a state official acting within his/her official
capacity is not a person for purposes of FCA liability since the state
official stands in the shoes of the sovereign. Nonetheless, Congress
has the authority to amend the FCA to include states as persons for
purposes of FCA liability.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF QuI TAM ACTIONS

There are several constitutional issues involved in qui tam
actions. The first issue comes under Article III regarding whether
individual citizens have standing to sue on behalf of the federal
government. A second issue, found under the rubric of the Eleventh
13°ld.
at 787. The Court also buttressed their opinion on two other considerations
mentioned but not discussed: first, "the ordinary rule of statutory construction" that "if
Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between States and the Federal
Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakingly clear in the language of the
statute" and second, the doctrine that statutes should be construed so as to avoid difficult

constitutional3 questions.

1 'See United States v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2001)

(holding that a School Board is a local government and that local governments are not
"persons" under the FCA.)
132ld.
t33
United States ex rel. Gaudineer & Comito, LLP v.lowa, 269 F.3d 932, 936 (8th
Cir. 2001)( citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). A state employee sued for money
damages for3actions taken in his official capacity stands in the shoes of the sovereign).
1"1d. at 937. To determine whether a state official is acting within the scope of
his/her official duties one must look at whether the alleged conduct of the defendant was
"outside of [his] official duties. Mere assertions that a state official issued standards that
conflicted with state law does not allege actions outside his official duties.
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Amendment, is whether a state can be subjected to liability under the
FCA. The third issue is whether qui tam actions violate the
constitutional principles of the Take Care Clause (also called the
separation of powers doctrine) or the Appointments Clause of Article
II. The United States Supreme Court has definitively answered the
first issue in the affirmative.' 35 However, the Court has yet to resolve
the Eleventh Amendment issue or the concerns regarding Article
11. 136
A. Article III Standing
In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens [hereinafter Stevens], the Supreme Court outlined three
requirements that must be met to establish Article III standing. 37
First, the relator must demonstrate an "injury in fact."' 38 The harm
must be both concrete and actual or imminent. 39 A conjectural or
hypothetical injury will not suffice. 4 Second, the relator must
establish causation) 4 There must be a traceable connection between
42
the alleged injury-in-fact and the defendant's alleged conduct.
Third, the relator must demonstrate that the requested relief will
remedy the injury.' 43 The Court stated that Stevens did not suffer any
injury in fact. 44 The Court rejected the theory that Stevens was a
designated agent and that his bounty was simply the fee he would
receive out of the United States' recovery for filing and/or
prosecuting a successful action on behalf of the government. 145 That
analysis "is precluded [...] by the fact that the [FCA] gives the relator
interest in the lawsuit and not merely a right to retain
an independent
146
a fee.',

However, the Court did conclude that the FCA can be
regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the government's
damages claim. 4 7 Thus, the United States' injury in fact is sufficient
to confer standing on a relator. 48 Perhaps surprisingly, the Court's
3

1 SSee Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
3

'See id.

'Id. at 77 1.
39

1 1d.

1401d.
141Stevens, 529 U.S. at 765.
2
141d.
3
141d.
45

' 1d. at 772.
146Id.
'*7Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773.
M'id.
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analysis of this issue is simple and direct for such a highly debated
and complicated issue.
B. Article II
1. Take Care Clause or Separation of Powers Doctrine

49

The Ninth Circuit has fortuitously become a leading authority
on the issue of separation of powers under the FCA.' ° In 1993, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the FCA gives the Attorney General
sufficient means of controlling or supervising relators to satisfy
separation of powers concern. 5 In so doing, the court looked to the
Supreme Court case, Morrison v. Olson, 152 for guidance, stating that
it was most analogous to its case. 153 The court flatly rejected
Boeing's argument that only the Executive Branch has the power to
enforce laws and therefore the power to prosecute violations of those
laws. 54 Qui tam actions do not involve the type of separation of
powers problem posed by one branch of government arrogating
power at the expense of another branch.' 55 Instead, qui tam actions
involve whether, and to what extent, the legislative branch may
diminish the executive branch's authority, without taking any of that
authority as5 6 its own, and remain within the constitutional
boundaries. 1
The Supreme Court has established that where an act of
Congress threatens another branch's authority and independence the
proper inquiry is whether Congress has "impermissibly undermined"
the role of that branch. 157 The issue regarding the FCA is whether qui
tam actions disrupt the proper balance between the branches by
preventing the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions. 158 The Ninth Circuit determined
that it had to decide whether the qui tam provisions accorded the
Executive Branch "sufficient control" over the conduct of the relators

49
' U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 3 reads: "... [the President] shall take Care that the Laws be
and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States."
faithfully executed,
0

"oSee Notten, supra note 17.

"'United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993).
52487 U.S. 654 (1988).

1id. (citing Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act do not impermissibly interfere with the
Executive Branch in violation of the separation of powers principle)).
functions ofthe
"41d.
'"See id.
6
5 See id.

'"Id.(citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856
(1986)).

,'See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993).
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to "ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally
assigned duties." 59
The Ninth Circuit concluded that under Morrison, the proper
inquiry is whether the FCA, taken as a whole, violates the principle
of separation of powers by unduly interfering with the President's
constitutional role. 160 The court compared the qui tam actions as a
whole to the independent counsel provisions, at issue in Morrison.'6'
The court noted the means found in Morrison by which the Executive
Branch can control an independent counsel's exercise of their
powers. 62 First, an independent counsel cannot "be appointed
without a specific request by the Attorney General, and the Attorney
13
General's decision not to request an appointment is unreviewable."'
Second, the Attorney General retains the power to remove an
independent counsel upon showing of "good cause."' 64 Third, the
jurisdiction of the independent counsel is "defined with reference to
the facts submitted by the Attorney General upon requesting an
appointment." 165 The Supreme Court held that these traits gave the
Executive Branch "sufficient control over the independent counsel to
ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally
assigned duties." 166
The Ninth Circuit looked at the control of the Executive
Branch under the FCA.' 67 First, the government can intervene in any
qui tam case and take control over prosecuting the action.' 68 Second,
the government can move for judicial limitations of the relator's
participation. 69 Third, the government can ask for a dismissal of a
case that it believes has no merit. 70 Fourth, the government can seek
a judicial stay of the relator's discovery; and the government is free to
seek other alternative remedies available.' 7' The court recognized
that the power to initiate litigation is exclusively an executive
function and that the government has greater authority to prevent the
initiation of prosecution by an independent counsel than by a qui tam
However, once prosecution has been initiated, the
relator.
government has greater control to limit the conduct of the relator and
59

i at 750 (citing Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988)).
1d.

6

1I1d.

161id.
1621d.
I6 d.at 753.

" Kelly, 9 F.3d at 743.

1611d. at 753.
'66d.
at 753.
67

1 1d.
'Rld.

1691d,

.77 Kelly, 9 F.3d at 743.
id.
172Id
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to end the litigation in a qui tam action than it does in an independent
counsel's action. 73 The court concluded that the power to end the
litigation makes it insignificant that the Executive Branch cannot
prevent its start. 174 Finding that the Executive Branch exercises at
least an equivalent amount of control over qui tam relators as it does
over independent counsels, the court determined that the FCA
satisfies the separation of powers concerns.'75
"The majority of courts have followed the Ninth Circuit and
have upheld the [FCA's] qui tam provisions."' 176 However, the Fifth
Circuit briefly departed from this majority. 177 In 1999, the Fifth
Circuit held that the FCA provisions permitting qui tam actions
violated the separation of powers doctrine. 78 Although the decision
reversed, the opinion and its analysis are
was subsequently
179
important.
The Fifth Circuit held that the FCA provisions permitting qui
tam actions to proceed when the government does not intervene
undermines the President's exercise of his constitutional duties
thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine.'8s In departing
from the Ninth Circuit's holdings, the Fifth Circuit looked at the
individual features of the Act at issue in Morrison and compared each
with the features of the qui tam action. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that none of the features present in Morrison were present
in the FCA's qui tam provisions.' 8' Furthermore, the court stated that
even when comparing the qui tam provisions as a whole to the
independent counsel provisions, that qui tam actions effect a greater
degree of encroachment of Executive prerogatives than the Act
upheld in Morrison.'8 2 The court then employed what appeared to be
a strict scrutiny test, stating that "the independent counsel device was
intended to address a narrow structural problem--the perceived
conflict of interest when the Attorney General is called upon to
investigate criminal wrongdoing by his colleagues in the Executive
Branch" and is "narrowly tailored" to achieve its purpose.'8 3 On the
other hand, the FCA qui tam provisions are not aimed at any

1731d.
4

1 1d.

175id.

176See
Noppen, supra note 17, at 586-87.
'See Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 586-87 (1999).
1781d.
"'See Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (2001).

'"Riley, 196 F.3d at 527.
"'Id. at 527-28.
"'231d. at 529.
I81d.

2002-20031

QUl TAM REVITALIZATION

defect and are not narrowly tailored to achieve their
structural
84
ends.
However, since Ripley would have created a split among
circuit courts, the case was reheard en banc.' 85 In 2001, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Stevens, the Fifth Circuit reversed its
prior decision. 186 The court began by stating that even though the
Supreme Court did not decide the issue, it was persuaded that it was
"logically inescapable that the same history that was conclusive on
the Article III question in Stevens, with respect to qui tam lawsuits
initiated under the FCA, is similarly conclusive with respect to the
Article II question concerning the statute."'187 The dissent in Stevens
also addressed the Article II issue, stating that historical evidence was
sufficient to resolve the Article II question.'
The court then addressed whether Article II requires Congress
to prescribe litigation by the Executive as the exclusive means of
enforcing federal law.'8 9 The court did a 180-degree turn-about from
its prior decision and declared that the Executive Branch retains
significant control over litigation initiated pursuant to the FCA.' 9'
The court continued by declaring that the Morrison decision was
inapplicable to qui tam cases for two reasons.' 9' First, the Act in
issue in Morrison "assigns the independent counsel to act as the
United States itself, in contrast to the qui tam FCA provisions, which
only authorize the relator to bring a lawsuit in the name of the United
States."'' 92 Second, the independent counsel undertakes functions
relevant to a criminal prosecution whereas relators are simply civil
litigants. 93 Therefore, since the provisions in Morrison and Riley
involved two different types of lawsuits, the Executive must wield
that constitutional duties
two different types of control to ensure
194
Upon.
infringed
not
are
II
Article
under
Although the analysis is different, all of the circuit courts are
in agreement that the qui tam provisions under the FCA do not
violate Article II separation of powers.

14Id.

'See Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 561 (2001).

1861d.

"'ld.at 752.
88

1 1d.(citing Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2001)).

1691d.
0

'91d.

'"Riley, 252 F.3d at 561.
"9Id.at 755.
1931d

1941d.
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95
2. Appointments Clause'

The second issue arising under Article II is whether the qui
tam provisions of the FCA violate the Appointments Clause. 96 The
usual situation in which Appointment Clause issues arise is when the
power to appoint is placed in the hands of the wrong branch or
governmental entity.197 The inquiry under the FCA however, is
whether unappointed qui tam relators "wield so much governmental
power that they must be appointed in conformity with the
Appointments Clause."' 98 Applying the test set forth in Buckley,
persons who are not appointed by a body with proper appointment
authority may not discharge functions that are properly discharged
only by officers. 9 9 The test set forth in Buckley is whether those
persons exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States. 200 Thus, the question the Ninth Circuit addressed was
whether "qui tam relators exercise significant authority under the FCA
and whether the FCA vests in relators 'primary responsibility' for
enforcing the Act by litigating in the federal courts.' 20'
In keeping with their conclusion that the Executive Branch
retains sufficient control of relators such that it does not impermissibly
undermine executive functions, the court determined that it is
"impossible to characterize the authority exercised by relators as so
significant that it must only be exercised by officers in the manner in
which [the Appointments Clause] prescribes., 20 2 The court stated that
linking the Appointments Clause and separation of powers analyses is
appropriate considering that the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Appointments Clause to serve the purpose of maintaining the
separation of powers in the constitutional scheme. 20 3 The court's
conclusion was that Buckley could not be fairly read as an unequivocal
rule allowing only officers to exercise any prosecutorial authority in

2 of the United States Constitution provides: The President, "shall
9Art. II,
§ 2,cl.
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be

established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, they think proper, in the President alone, in the Court of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments." Id.
2.
'96See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl.

United States ex rel.
Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993).
197See
'"Id.at 757.
2'99Buckley

v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1,140 (1976).

0"ld.
t

" Kelly, 9 F.3d at 743.
...
2 3 Id.at 758.
0 1d.
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the name of the United States. °4 Instead, Buckley directs only that
persons with primary responsibility and significant authority to
enforce laws through litigation must be considered officers.20 5
The Fifth Circuit also concluded that the qui tam provisions
do not violate the Appointments Clause, but differed in their
reasoning.206 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the court defined
an officer as one with "a continuing and formalized relationship of
employment with the United States Government."20 7 The court
concluded that there was no such employment relationship with regard
to qui tam relators and therefore they were not subject to the benefits
or requirements associated with officers of the United States.208 Based
on these conclusions the court was persuaded that the qui tam
provisions did not violate the Appointments Clause.20 9
Although the Ninth and Fifth Circuits disagree on the
analysis, they do agree on the outcome: qui tam provisions under the
FCA do not violate either the Take Care Clause or the Appointments
Clause of Article I1.
C. The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment 2t 0 only applies when citizens bring
suit against a state.2 ' Consequently, the federal government can
bring suit against a state without violating the Eleventh Amendment.
The pivotal issue in qui tam actions is whether the suit is a private
action brought by an individual or by the United States. If it is
determined that a qui tam suit is brought by an individual the case is
barred. Conversely, if it is determined that a qui tam suit is brought
by the United States the case is not barred.
The Supreme Court avoided addressing this question in
Stevens by holding that states are not considered persons under the
False Claims Act.2t2 However, Congress has the power to amend the
2041d. at 758 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126).
25
0 id
2
2"See
7

Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (2001).
0 Id. at 757 (citing Auffomordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (finding that a
merchant appraiser is not an officer for purposes of the Appointments Clause where his position
is without tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous duties); United States v.

Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511-12 (1878) (holding that a surgeon appointed by Commissioner of
Pensions was not an officer where his duties were not continuing and permanent)).
2°'Reiley, 252 F.3dat 749.
2
09d.
21
'The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."

U.S. CONST. amend XI.
2

'U.S. CONST. amend XI.

212

Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
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FCA to define person so as to include states. If Congress makes such
an amendment to the FCA, then the Eleventh Amendment becomes a
pivotal issue in a qui tam suit. Although the majority expressed no
view on whether a relator suing a state would run afoul of the
Eleventh Amendment, they hinted that there was "serious doubt on
that score. 213 The dissent, however, did express a view on the
214
The dissent first claimed that, based
Eleventh Amendment issue.
on the legislative history of 1986, Congress intended for states and
state agencies to be included in the definition of persons. 2 1 As such,
216
the dissent proceeded to address the Eleventh Amendment issue.
The Court noted that the Eleventh Amendment is not applicable as a
defense to a suit brought by the federal government. 2 17 The dissent
then argued that it is essentially the federal government suing the
state since the relator is suing as an assignee of the United States and
thus the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar. 218 Although this is the
opinion of only two dissenting Justices, it is a strong argument
against the Eleventh Amendment barring such a suit.
The Eleventh Amendment issue is moot for now. However,
should Congress amend the FCA to include states in the definition of
person, this issue will become extremely important to states, state
agencies, environmental litigators, and ultimately the Supreme Court.
V. CONCLUSION
The FCA is an old tool revitalized for new purposes.
Although the Act was originally intended to stop Civil War
contractors from defrauding the government, it has been expanded to
stop all persons from defrauding the government in any given
situation where the government is giving money to that person based
on claims presented by the person to the government. 219 Recently the
FCA has been used to target environmental violators who have
defrauded the government."
The FCA should be viewed as adding another layer of
protection to the environment. Every major environmental statute
contains a citizen suit provision, which allows a citizen plaintiff to
sue a violator if the plaintiff has suffered individual injury. 221 The
213

Id.at 787 (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)).
1d.
'5Id.at 801-02,

214

216
2171d.
2
2

1d. at 802.
I"Stevens, 529 U.S. at 765.
"See Schmidt, supra note 33.

2
.SeeLininger,
221

supra note I1.
Thompson, supra note 5,at 192.
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FCA picks up where citizen suits are inapplicable. Under the FCA, a
plaintiff can sue without having sustained individual
injury since the
222
plaintiff is suing on behalf of the government.
The FCA should be in every environmental litigator's arsenal.
However, it must be remembered that the FCA has its statutory and
constitutional limits. Currently, however, the constitutional limits are
essentially nonexistent, although the Supreme Court has not ruled on
whether qui tam provisions violate Article II concerns of separation
of powers and the Appointments Clause.223 The focus of litigators
who rely on the FCA should be towards learning the statutory
limitations and awareness of possible constitutional limitations in the
future.

22
1 See
223

Stevens. 529 U.S. at 765.
See id.

